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‘This is What Democracy Looks Like’: New 
Labour’s Blind Spot and Peripheral Vision 
 
David Judge 
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New Labour in government since 1997 has been roundly criticized for not 
possessing a clear, coherent and consistent democratic vision. The absence of such a 
grand vision has resulted, from this critical perspective, in an absence of ‘joined-up’ 
thinking about democracy in an evolving multi-level state. Tensions have been all 
too apparent between the government’s desire to exert central direction — 
manifested in its most pathological form as ‘control freakery’ — and its 
democratising initiatives derived from ‘third-way’ obsessions with ‘decentralising’, 
‘empowering’ and ‘enabling’. The purpose of this article is to examine why New 
Labour displayed such apparently impaired democratic vision and why it appeared 
incapable of conceiving of democratic reform ‘in the round’. This article seeks to 
explain these apparent paradoxes, however, through utilising the notion of 
‘macular degeneration’. In this analysis, the perceived democratic blind spot of 
New Labour at Westminster is connected to a democratic peripheral vision, which 
has envisaged innovative participatory and decentred initiatives in governance 
beyond Westminster. 
 
Keywords: British politics; devolution; executive-legislative relations; parliamentary 
democracy; participation; Westminster model 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
‘This is What Democracy Looks Like’ 
 
These words have reverberated around the streets of major cities throughout 
the world in the 21st century, as demonstrators and protestors have railed 
against a variety of perceived injustices perpetrated by individual governments 
and global capitalismalike . It was perhaps of no surprise, therefore, to hear 
these very words echoing through the genteel cobbled streets of Edinburgh as 
demonstrators fought sporadic battles with riot police on the occasion of the 
G8 summit in Scotland in July 2005 (see The Herald, 5 July 2005). Yet the 
images of riots and mass demonstrations were not the images normally 
associated, in the minds of British politicians and the public, with the workings 
of ‘their democracy’. Indeed, within a few days of the mass demonstrations in 
Edinburgh, and after the suicide bombings in London on 7 July, the UK’s 
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prime minister, MPs of all parties, press commentators, and members of the 
public alike, were quick to invoke a vision of ‘our democracy’ which was 
starkly counterposed to the images of mass murder on and below the streets of 
London, and to the mass protests on and around the streets of Scottish cities 
during the course of the G8 summit. What democracy looked like in this vision 
was a peaceful process of deliberation and compromise associated with 
parliamentary democracy. As the then Home Secretary, Charles Clarke, 
informed the House of Commons (HC) on the day of the London bombings: 
It is encouraging that right across every fragment of opinion in the House, we 
say that our democratic methods are the way to prevail and that we are 
determined to do whatever we must in order to ensure that those who seek to 
destroy that democracy are unable to carry out what they would wish (HC 
Debates, 7 July 2005, vol. 436, col. 469). 
 
But what were these ‘Democratic Methods’? 
 
The vision of democracy subscribed to in the official statements of the New 
Labour government was clear and orthodox. In essence it was a simple and 
unmediated perspective of the Westminster model. Indeed, the continuing 
centrality of that model had been reaffirmed throughout Labour’s period in 
office after 1997 and was captured succinctly in the official statement: 
 
The United Kingdom is a Parliamentary democracy. Sovereignty rests with 
the Crown in Parliament. Law making rests with the tripartite sovereignty of 
Crown in both Houses of Parliament. In practice, the powers of the three 
parts are uneven. The House of Commons [has long] been established as 
the pre-eminent constitutional authority within the UK. The Government is 
formed by the Party which can command the support of the House of 
Commons. The Party which secures a majority [at a General Election] has 
the right to forma Government and, subject to sustaining its Parliamentary 
majority, to carry through the programme set out in its election Manifesto. 
Ministers are continuously accountable to the House of Commons through 
debates and votes; a process formalised and fortified by the role of the non- 
Government Parties in forming an Opposition, with the largest non- 
Government Party occupying the position of Official Opposition. This 
constitutional framework, founded on the pre-eminence of the House of 
Commons, has provided Britain with effective democratic Government and 
accountability for more than a century, and few would wish to change it 
(Cm5291, 2001, paras 13–17). 
 
It was no coincidence that the word ‘effective’ preceded the word ‘democratic’ 
in the phrase ‘effective democratic government’. Historically representative 
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government in the UK has been conceived and functioned as a means of 
legitimating executive power (see Judge, 1993, 2; 2005, 28). An executive centric 
state has been justified in terms of a legislative-centric theory of 
parliamentary sovereignty. The practical pre-eminence of the executive in the 
UK state has thus been founded upon the theoretical ‘pre-eminence of the 
House of Commons’. This has been the central paradox of the parliamentary 
state and has been routinely noted as the central dilemma confronting New 
Labour’s programme of constitutional reform. 
 
Westminster at the Centre: Loss of Central Vision 
 
In the Westminster model the authority of government stems from its 
majoritarian position in the House of Commons. This majoritarian position 
marks the focal point of the state system. It is literally ‘the centre’ of 
government. However, from this position the vision of government is afflicted 
by a particular form of macular degeneration.1 A ‘blind spot’ develops out of 
the conjunction of the two institutions ‘parliament’ and ‘government’ into a 
blurred vision of ‘parliamentary government’. In this conjunction, the House 
of Commons is located at the centre of the political executive’s vision, yet 
superimposed upon, and ultimately obscuring, the view of parliament itself is 
the image of ‘strong government’. In this manner, parliament and government 
are merged into a single, symbiotic image — of parliamentary government. 
From this mono-focal perspective, the political executive loses sight of 
parliament as a discrete institution; and comes to see itself as simply the preeminent, 
majoritarian element of the representative lower House. In this sense, 
as Labour MP Graham Allen (2003, 20) notes, the House of Commons has 
become, in effect, a ‘House of Government’. Another Labour MP, Tony 
Wright (2004, 867), reinforces this view: ‘There is a fundamental fact that in 
Britain, the executive is particularly strong and Parliament commensurately 
weak. Behind the constitutional rhetoric about the sovereignty of Parliament 
there lies the reality of executive dominance in a political system which 
concentrates power rather than divides it’. 
 
In its acute form, governmental macular degeneration has revealed the 
symptoms of ‘elective dictatorship’. The phrase was popularized by Lord 
Hailsham(1978, 22) in his analysis of a system in which ‘parliament is 
omnipotent, and since the government can rely on a majority in the 
Commons there are few effective limits to the powers of a government y 
Practically no other civilised country has invested its representatives with such 
unlimited authority’ (ibid., 101). If anything, this position has been perceived to 
have become even more acute under New Labour governments (see, for 
example, Power Inquiry, 2006, 128–135). 
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Certainly with majorities of 178 and 167 after the 1997 and 2001 elections 
the policy preferences of government and the legislative outputs of parliament 
were unlikely to diverge to any significant degree. For a government elected on 
a ‘guiding rule not to promise what we cannot deliver; and to deliver what we 
promise’ (Labour Party, 1997, 2), ‘getting things done’ and ‘driving forward 
reform, building lasting change’ (Blair quoted in Ludlam, 2004, 1) was at the 
heart of a continuing commitment to ‘British renewal’ (Labour Party, 2001, 3). 
Here was a government which proclaimed that it ‘made decisions because they 
were right — not because they were destined to be popular’ (ibid., 2005, 9); and 
made a virtue of making a ‘covenant’ (ibid., 1997, 1) with the electorate to be 
accountable for its record in government. 
 
If New Labour’s priority was thus to be afforded to ‘delivery’, its focus was 
upon efficiency and modernisation in government to achieve this objective. If 
the government already knew it was right, it did not wish to be impeded 
unnecessarily by other institutions, or people, telling it that it was not. 
Successive electoral victories in 1997, 2001 and 2005 confirmed to the 
government, in its own collective mind at least, that the electorate had 
acknowledged that it was right; and the electoral system had provided the 
necessary majorities in parliament to confirm this ‘rightness’. In this sense, the 
majoritarianism of the parliamentary system was not seen as a problem by 
New Labour governments, just as it had not been by any of its post-war 
predecessors. In this respect, New Labour governments after 1997 simply 
displayed the same symptoms of macular degeneration that had afflicted all 
post-war governments. For all governments, single party majoritarianism was 
not seen as a failing, but instead was deemed to be a virtue, of parliamentary 
democracy in the UK. What prevented single party majoritarianism from 
tipping over into single party dictatorship, in this view, was the chain of 
accountability linking governments to elected representatives in parliament and 
through themto the electorate at large. 
 
Beyond Westminster, however, the degenerative symptoms afflicting the 
central vision of the executive were widely perceived. The related pathologies 
— of executive mentality; conjoined party, legislative and executive leadership 
roles; the nature of party competition, and the executive’s risk-aversion to the 
media — cumulated in the inversion of the idealised serial flow of 
accountability at the heart of the Westminster model and left a democratic 




An ‘executive mentality’ has long been observed by commentators (see Judge, 
1981, 1990, 1993, 2005; Flinders, 2002). At one level it is ascribed to an 
instrumental logic of government. Reduced to its simplest formulation this 
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logic assumes that all governments wish to implement their policy pledges as 
efficiently and as expeditiously as possible. What remains unclear, however, is 
why ‘efficiency’ would be privileged by ministers over ‘legitimacy’ derived from 
rigorous scrutiny? After all, the very same politicians, as shadow ministers, 
were only too aware of the democratic pathologies associated with ‘efficiency’ 
and ‘strength’ of government. 
 
One partial explanation is to be found in analyses, which focus on the 
personal characteristics and predilections of prime ministers over the past 25 
years, and their preferences for ‘authoritarian populism’ (Mrs Thatcher) or 
‘control freakery’ (Mr Blair). The problem with this argument is to explain why 
the UK historically has been so unfortunate in its choice of prime ministers, as 
‘authoritarian’ or ‘dictatorial’ tendencies had been ascribed to PMs long before 
Mrs Thatcher and Mr Blair. Low (1904, 158), for example, identified Pitt, Peel, 
Palmerston, Disraeli and Gladstone as ‘coming near’ to being dictators. 
Bogdanor (2003, 10) updated this list by noting that Balfour, Lloyd George, 
Neville Chamberlain, Churchill, Macmillan, Wilson and Heath had allegedly 
taken upon themselves, at various stages in their respective relationships with 
their own cabinet colleagues, powers ‘not inferior to that of a dictator’. Such an 
extensive list suggests that explanations revolving around personality or 
individual agency are insufficient in themselves in explaining why a universal 
executive mentality develops in the UK. In which case, other structural and 
institutional explanations have to be examined as well. What becomes 
immediately apparent is that UK governments become locked into common 
modes, or trajectories, of behaviour and working routines (irrespective of party 
composition or the personal characteristics of leaders). These routines reflect 
the inter-institutional relationships at the heart of the Westminster model. In 
this sense, ‘new institutional’ notions of path dependency provide analytical 
purchase in trying to explain executive macular degeneration (see Judge, 2005, 
9–15). The paradox is that ‘the path’ is determined beyond the executive itself. 
The basic institutional features of the Westminster model were captured in 
the government’s formal statement noted above: the government is drawn from 
the House of Commons and derives its authority as the largest party in the 
House; and as long as it sustains this majority support the government has the 
right to implement its policy programme, subject to the scrutiny of, and its 
accountability to, elected representatives. Yet this simple institutional model, 
in sketching a serial flow of responsibility which links the governed to their 
governors, obscures a far more complex portrait of an interwoven institutional 
chain of elections, parties, legislature and executive. In this chain, the 
institutional characteristics of the executive are ‘determined’ successively and 
cumulatively by linkages of responsibility. Thus, if New Labour in government 
has obtained a reputation for ‘control freakery’, despite its pronouncements in 
opposition in favour of modernisation and democratisation, it is because of the 
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institutional matrix within which it has to operate. It is worthwhile, therefore, 
disentangling the institutional strands of this matrix. 
 
The first requirement of government is to win elections. In this respect, the 
Labour party has successfully transformed itself from its position, in the 1980s 
and early 1990s, as an electoral liability to one of electoral ascendancy by 2005 
— with New Labour winning three successive general elections and with its 
leader becoming the longest serving Labour PM. This transformation was 
effected both through ideological reorientation and an internal modernisation of 
the party’s organisational structure. Two parallel organisational reforms were 
undertaken: first, the party-trade union link was loosened; and, second, the 
leader’s autonomy from members was increased (see Quinn, 2004; Russell, 
2005). Cumulatively in opposition there was a drift towards ‘a more powerful 
central apparatus, greater organisational centralisation, more concentrated 
patterns of authority, and tauter discipline’ (Shaw, 2004, 67). In part, the internal 
demand for greater discipline and coherence within the party reflected its 
external relationships with the electorate generally and also with a wider media 
culture specifically. This was a rapidly changing media culture in the 1990s and 
one characterised by: increased fragmentation and pluralism of media outlets; 
the advent of ‘24 hour news’; the changing conventions of political coverage — 
with disputation, rumour, and non-deference the preferred style — and with 
‘laser journalism’ premised upon a belief that politicians were ‘the liars-in-chief, 
the gatekeepers of vaults of dirty big secrets that wait for the deployment of 
journalistic diligence and courage to be discovered’ (John Lloyd quoted in 
Bartle, 2005, 130). In particular, as Cowley observes (2005, 10): 
 
Few members of the British media follow US President Herbert Hoover’s 
injunction that ‘honest differences of views and honest debate are not 
disunity. They are the vital process of policy-making among free men’. 
Deviations fromthe party line are instead always pounced upon as evidence 
of disunity. 
 
Thus, as Tony Blair noted early in his premiership, ‘ill-discipline allowed us to 
be painted as extremist, out of touch and divided. It helped keep us out of 
power for 18 years’ (The Independent, 20 November 1998). If the relationship 
between New Labour and the media was defined before entry into office, the 
pathologies of this relationship were ultimately to become intertwined with the 
pathologies of the institutional relationship between legislature and executive. 
The obsession in the media with ‘splits’ reflected an assumption of an 
adversarial, zero-sum political culture, and, in turn, came not simply to mirror 
but also to entrench that adversarial culture. Before examining this latter 
relationship it should be noted that even after its ideological transmogrification 
and organisational renewal New Labour remained an ideological ‘coalition’ — 
of remnants of ‘Old Labour’, social democratic revisionists, modernisers, and 
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born-again ‘third way-ers’. That these fractions continued to coalesce in a 
single party had much to do with the nature of the UK’s first-past-the-post 
electoral system that rewarded the two major parties with disproportionate 
representation in the Commons, and routinely, disproportionate majorities for 
the governing party. 
 
The style of electoral politics reflected a broader, national style of 
politics — one that was characterized by Finer over 30 years ago as ‘adversary 
politics’. Finer was in no doubt that this style was the ‘fruit of the two-party 
system, and this itself is the consequence of our electoral system’ (1975, ix). 
The essence of this system was a ‘stand-up fight’ with ‘rival teams of 
politicians in open contention which goes on before an election, during an 
election, and — above all — continues after the election, in the form of 
continuous polemic across the floor of the Commons where a powerless 
Opposition confronts an all-powerful Government’ (ibid., 3). The adversarial 
system, therefore, not only affects the style of electoral campaigning and 
reporting, but also impacts upon the organisation of parties and the nature of 
party competition (see Aspinwall, 2004, 4; McHugh and Parvin, 2005, 20), 
as well as influencing the institutional relationship between parliament and 
the executive. 
 
Executive and Legislature 
 
Two basic features characterise the relationship between the executive and the 
legislature in the UK. The first is that the members of the political executive are 
drawn from the legislature. In other words, holding executive office and being a 
member of parliament (overwhelmingly an elected member) are coterminous 
positions. Second, political leadership positions in the executive are synonymous 
with leadership positions in the majority party. As Weir and Beetham 
(1999, 372) observe: ‘Parliament, therefore, has little distinct life or identity of 
its own, separate from government and party’. This conjunction of institutional 
leadership roles — whereby leaders of the majority party simultaneously hold 
parliamentary and executive leadership roles (neatly encapsulated in the fact 
that the formal parliamentary office of Leader of the House of Commons is 
occupied by a cabinet minister) — means that discrete party, parliamentary 
and executive norms are transmuted into an overarching ‘executive mentality’. 
As the House of Commons’ Modernisation Committee noted: ‘Ministers are 
also Members of Parliament, and are sustained in office by Parliament’ and 
that ‘party loyalty and organization structure the way in which Parliament 
and its institutions work’ (HC 300, 2000, para 9). This conjunction (and 
confusion) was summarised by one reformist, former Leader of the House 
Robin Cook (2003, 153): 
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Most MPs are deeply ambivalent about their primary role. MPs usually 
recognise that somewhere in their job description is a responsibility to protect 
the privileges and independence of Parliament. At the same time all 
MPs are elected on a party ticket and came to Westminster not as 
independents but as partisans. This dual identity of MPs ensures a constant 
struggle between the perception of the role of Parliament and their sense of 
belonging to a party fraction. 
 
Routinely, the latter perception overrides the former. The norms of party 
loyalty are evident in a series of surveys and academic studies (see, for example, 
Searing, 1994; Rush, 2001; Cowley, 2002, 2005). While these norms are not 
absolutes, it remains the case that the ‘overwhelming desire on the part of the 
vast majority [is] not to do anything that might make their party appear 
divided’ (Cowley, 2002, 182). Certainly the risk-aversion of modern executives 
in exposing themselves to hostile partisan and media criticism and ‘political 
embarrassment’ has led them to prioritise party loyalty. But it also engenders 
an insularity and secretiveness at the core of the relationship between the 
executive and the legislature. When linked to the adversarial nature of 
parliamentary discourse and procedures, the prioritisation of party loyalty — 
in the face of perceived threats of hostile, and potentially malicious, scrutiny 
from opposition parties and media alike—the executive retreats into a ‘bunker 
mentality’ wherein: ‘we are not going to tell [MPs] more than we can about 
what is going to discredit us’. These words were certainly issued by a Labour 
politician, and certainly could have been associated with New Labour, but, in 
fact, they are the words of James Callaghan some 25 years before Tony Blair 
came to power (Cmnd 5104, 1972). 
 
Inversion of Accountability 
 
Risk-aversion, in the form of sensitivity to partisan embarrassment and fear of 
political ‘discrediting’, continues to underpin the normative system of the 
modern political executive. Although the revised Ministerial Code emphasises 
that ‘Ministers have a duty to Parliament to account, and be held to account, 
for the policies, decision and actions of their department and agencies’ 
(Cabinet Office, 2005a, 1.5 b), and that they should be ‘as open as possible with 
Parliament and the public’ (ibid., 1.5d), the Code also propounds certain 
‘principles’ which should guide the interactions of members of the executive 
with parliament. Ironically these principles are elaborated explicitly for only 
the most junior members of the executive, Parliamentary Private Secretaries, 
who are clearly advised that they are ‘expected to support the Government in 
all divisions’ and ‘should avoid associating themselves with recommendations 
critical or embarrassing to the Government’ (ibid., 2.9). Ministers themselves 
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are simply cautioned that they are subject to the conventions of ministerial 
responsibility. Collective responsibility requires that ‘Ministers should be able 
to express their views frankly in the expectation that they can argue freely in 
private while maintaining a united front when decisions have been reached. 
This in turn requires that the privacy of opinions expressed in cabinet and 
ministerial committees should be maintained’ (ibid., 6.17). The expectation is 
that ‘once a decision has been announced, it should be accepted without 
question or criticism’, and certainly ministers are expected to ‘avoid criticism of 
government policies’ (ibid., 4.6). In practice, however, such expectations often 
remained unfulfilled. Even the deputy prime minister, John Prescott, was 
accused of embarrassing the government in December 2005 in his public 
criticismof the government’s education white paper (see The Sunday Telegraph, 
18 December 2005, 4; The Evening Standard, 19 December 2005, 2; 
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/4539074.stm). 
 
Similarly the constitutional convention of individual ministerial responsibility 
has provided ‘a strong determinant of the structural development of 
administrative organisation and therefore the style of government’ (Radcliffe, 
1991, 29). Notions of individual ministerial responsibility have served not only 
to operationalise the external requirements of accountability, but have also 
served to sustain the internal organisational requirements of political control 
within departments (see Judge, 2005, 120–123). Significantly, the ‘accountability’ 
of departmental ministers to parliament, and the cascaded relationships 
within departments stemming from this external accountability, have been 
based upon ‘normal rules’ of confidentiality pertaining to civil service advice 
(Cabinet Office, 2005a, para 2.14). In turn, these ‘normal’ internal rules have 
come to prescribe the external relationship between departments and 
Parliament: ‘Civil servants should not without authority disclose official 
information which has been communicated in confidence within the Administration’ 
(Cabinet Office, 1999, para 10).2 
 
Thus, a central paradox of the parliamentary state in the UK is the fact that 
the constitutional logic of the convention of ministerial responsibility — of 
executive openness and accountability — is inverted by a more immediate, 
pragmatic, political logic that serves to insulate executives from accountability 
(see Judge, 1993, 2005) and ultimately to ‘eviscerate the participatory claims of 
reformers’ (Flinders, 2002, 27). In this inversion of accountability, the 
precipitants of executive macular degeneration are to be found. 
 
Parliamentary Reform: Blind spot at the Centre of Parliamentary 
Democracy 
 
When assessing New Labour’s programme of parliamentary reform since 1997 
it is important, as Tony Wright (2004, 868) counsels, to take into account the 
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‘underlying reality’ of executive dominance in a parliamentary system based 
upon the electoral competition of disciplined political parties. This is also a 
reality which blurs the notions of parliamentary government and parliamentary 
democracy, and in which reforms to enhance the capacities of government are 
often misperceived as enhancements of democracy. 
 
For all that New Labour in office had an impressive record of reformist 
endeavour in Westminster (see Kelso, 2006), the modernising agenda outlined 
in the 1997 manifesto remained unfulfilled by the time of the 2005 general 
election. Even Labour’s own manifesto in 2005 acknowledged that there was 
still a pressing need to ‘continue to support reforms that improve 
parliamentary accountability and scrutiny’ (Labour party 2005, 111). Indeed, 
it could hardly argue otherwise. A broad consensus of opinion both inside and 
outside of Westminster was in no doubt that further reform was necessary. In 
its partisan guise, this sentiment was expressed in the Conservative manifesto 
thus: 
 
Under Mr Blair the way we are governed has become less accountable, more 
complex and, ultimately, less democratic. The House of Commons has 
been steadily undermined, and proper reform of the House of Lords has been 
repeatedly promised but never delivered. The House of Commons needs to 
be made more capable of standing up to the executive’ (Conservative party, 
2005, 21). 
 
In a more academic formulation this view found expression in 
Brazier et al.’s (2005, 78) conclusion that: ‘despite some improvements, 
Parliament remains in many ways an inefficient and, some would allege, 
largely ineffective institution while there have been some important 
changes in the relationship between the executive and Parliament, it 
remains clear that the balance of power remains firmly in the lap of the 
former’. Similarly, in his assessment of the record of New Labour’s 
parliamentary modernisation programme, Tony Wright drew a distinction 
between ‘modernisation as efficiency’ — which was ‘favoured by governments’ 
and was ‘essentially executive-minded’ — and ‘modernisation as scrutiny’ — 
which ‘wants to shift the balance between the executive and legislature in 
significant respects’ and which ‘is much less attractive to governments’ (2004, 
869–870). Not surprisingly Wright concluded that the former kind of 
modernisation had prevailed over the latter (see also House of Commons, 
2005a; Kelso, 2006). 
 
Where the ‘blind spot’ of the New Labour government was most apparent 
was in the consistency with which it defended the convention of ministerial 
responsibility — but in a defensive and insular formulation. This formulation 
was particularly evident in the executive’s interactions with select committees. 
On the one hand, the government committed itself to openness and 
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accountability and advised civil servants appearing before select committees 
that: 
 
The central principle to be followed is that it is the duty of officials to 
be as helpful as possible to Select Committees. Officials should be as 
forthcoming as they can in providing information care should be taken to 
ensure that no information is withheld which would not be exempted if a 
parallel request were made under the FOI Act (Cabinet Office, 2005b, 
para 53). 
 
Yet, on the other hand, officials were also counselled that they should: 
 
as far as possible confine their evidence to questions of fact and explanation 
relating to government policies and actions. Officials should as far as 
possible avoid being drawn into discussion of the merits of alternative 
policies where this is politically contentious (ibid., para 55). 
 
The general debilitating effects of this prohibition upon parliamentary scrutiny 
of executive actions had been apparent since the inception of the select 
committee system in 1979 (see Judge 1981, 1983, 1993, 2005).More specific and 
contemporary effects were noted, however, in the contrast between the access 
to information afforded to the Hutton and Butler Inquiries and that afforded 
routinely to select committees (HC 446, 2004, para 87). While the House of 
Commons’ Liaison Committee was convinced that it was only ‘reasonable to 
expect that select committees should receive Government co-operation as fully 
as an inquiry set up by the government itself’ (ibid., para 89), the executive’s 
actions continued to confound this reasonable expectation. Thus, despite its 
undertakings to be as ‘forthcoming and helpfulyin providing information’ 
(Cabinet Office, 2005b, para 9), and especially to allow special advisers to 
appear before select committees (HC 1180-I, 2004, q1; q26; Cabinet Office, 
2005b, para 44), in practice the government continued to display a reluctance 
to allow open access to ‘those at the centre of government who are called on to 
advise on those public policy issues affecting the whole of government’ (HC 
690, 2005, para 12). The unwillingness of the Prime Minister in particular to 
permit key advisers (most notably Lord Birt in late 2005)3 to give evidence to 
committees elicited the damning response of the Public Administration 
Committee: 
 
In refusing to allow its special advisers to appear before the Committee on 
inquiries which are directly germane to their work, the Government, and No. 
10 in particular, has failed to live up to its undertakings. This is 
hampering, unnecessarily, the ability of Parliament to undertake effective 
scrutiny (ibid.). 
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The exasperation of the chairmen of select committees shone through in the 
question posed to the PM in his appearance before the Liaison Committee in 
November 2005: 
 
Parliament is supposed to be the focal point of accountability for ministers 
and yet we cannot get anything like the volume of information nor the easy 
access of witnesses that were provided to Hutton and Butler. Can you not see 
that leads to the impression that if you want to get a proper inquiry you have 
to go outside Parliament because the Government will not co-operate with its 
internal inquiries? (HC 709-i, 2005, q9). 
 
Indeed, backbench MPs have often sought information ‘outside Parliament’ 
when confronted by executive recalcitrance. This has involved the use of the 
provisions of both Freedom of Information and Data Protection legislation 
(see HC 136, 2002, 5–6; House of Commons, 2005b; Brazier et al., 2005, 
54–56). 
 
Peripheral Vision: Democracy Beyond Parliament 
 
The Freedom of Information Act 2000 
 
In itself, the very fact that the Freedom of Information (FOI) Act 2000 came 
into force in January 2005 might appear to undermine the contention that the 
New Labour government continued to display the symptoms of macular 
degeneration. Indeed, in reviewing the first year of the operation of the Act, 
Lord Falconer, Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs, emphasised the 
point that: 
 
Oppositions talk of freedom of information. They tend to forget that talk 
when they become governments. We did not. From 1 January 2005, we 
introduced a legally enforceable freedom of information regime (The 
Guardian, 31 December 2005). 
 
Lord Falconer went on to state that ‘Good government is open government’. 
Though he also noted that there was a case for the ‘legitimate retention of 
information in order to promote good government in the public interest’. In 
essence, his argument reflected the orthodoxy of all UK executives: ‘It does not 
promote good government toypublish details of ongoing internal policy 
discussion where people express their views and advice on the basis it is 
confidential. Governments of all political stripes need the space to govern for 
all of the public’ (The Guardian, 31 December 2005). 
 
Due praise was afforded to the New Labour government on passing the FOI 
Act, and in responding to 19,374 FOI requests received by government 
departments under the Act in its first year (in total 37,849 requests were 
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received by 42 government bodies in 2005, see Department of Constitutional 
Affairs, 2006, 17). Predictably, however, there were concerns about the 
implementation of the Act and the speed with which requests were processed. 
Even more predictably, perhaps, there was consternation at the significant 
limitations upon disclosure of information that remained. Under Section 35 of 
the 2000 Act, for example, there are class-based exemptions relating to the 
formulation or development of government policy; ministerial communications; 
the provision of advice by any of the Law Officers; or the operation of 
any ministerial private office. In effect, such exemptions left ‘control over large 
tracts of information, much of it exactly the information that the public and 
press would need to have access to in order to hold government to account, in 
the hands of ministers’ (Oliver, 2003, 167; see also Evans, 2003, 208–214).4 
 
Human Rights Act 
 
Notions of ‘citizenship’ link the issues of open government and human rights in 
the minds of many advocates of increased democratisation in the UK (see 
Wright, 1994; Evans, 2003, 158–163, 177–180; Oliver, 2003, 160–161, 124–130). 
In this approach ‘individuals are rights bearers as well as citizens in a political 
community’ (Oliver, 2003, 160). Historically, however, the Labour party had 
subscribed to the view that ‘the protection of rights was a matter for 
Parliament: individual rights were to be won in Parliament and to be secured 
and preserved there’ (Ewing, 1999, 81). In moving from this historic stance, at 
least one commentator found it ‘most remarkable’ that ‘no leader of New 
Labour, which had engineered the assault on parliamentary sovereignty which 
the Human Rights Act (HRA) represented, was prepared to articulate an 
accepted revised philosophy’ (Stevens, 2002, 135). Indeed, it is worth 
examining the two parts of Stevens’ statement sequentially: to determine the 
extent to which, first, there was an ‘assault on parliamentary sovereignty’; and, 
second, why a revised philosophy would remain unarticulated. 
 
From the outset, New Labour did not seek a frontal assault on 
parliamentary sovereignty but rather sought to ‘deliver a modern reconciliation 
of the inevitable tension between the democratic right of the majority to 
exercise political power and the democratic need of individuals and minorities 
to have their human rights secured’ (the then Lord Chancellor Lord Irvine, 
House of Lords Debates, 3 November 1997, vol. 582, col. 1234). When the 
needs of the latter conflicted with the requirements of the former (in the form 
of a majority party exercising political power) then ‘reconciliation’ was heavily 
skewed in the former’s favour. In fact, the example of New Labour’s antiterrorist 
legislation neatly encapsulated the nature of ‘reconciliation’ between 
the exercises of executive power and the human rights of individuals and 
minorities.5 
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In introducing its human rights legislation the government was adamant 
that the principle of parliamentary sovereignty had not been infringed. 
Nonetheless, when introducing the Prevention of Terrorism Bill 2005, the then 
Home Secretary, Charles Clarke, acknowledged that the HRA had engendered 
a new, more complex, reality of the relationship between the judiciary, the 
executive and parliament: 
 
What I do think is that when the Law Lords of this country make a set of 
criticisms [ruling that section 23 of the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security 
Act 2001 was incompatible with the European Convention on Human 
Rights] about the way that we are operating that is well founded, by a vote of 
eight to one, it is incumbent on the Government—and I would argue on 
Parliament—to respond to that and decide how to deal with it (HC Debates, 
23 February 2005, vol. 431, col. 346). 
 
What was equally apparent during the passage of New Labour’s anti-terrorism 
measures was that the government did not welcome critical parliamentary 
‘responses’, especially those from the House of Lords, about the unprecedented 
scope of the powers of the new legislation. Although the government was 
insistent that the new legislation was ‘fully compatible’ with the European 
Convention on Human Rights, it encountered significant and sustained 
parliamentary opposition in both Houses precisely because of concerns about 
‘compatibility’. Indeed, so great was the opposition to a proposed clause 
extending the period of pre-charge detention to 90 days that the New Labour 
government suffered its first defeats in a vote in the House of Commons in 
November 2005. What the defeats illustrated were the intertwined and variable 
interinstitutional interactions between party, legislature, executive and 
judiciary. 
 
What is of particular importance for present purposes, however, was the 
response of the Prime Minister to defeat in the House of Commons. Mr Blair’s 
belief, noted earlier, on being right, and its corollary of impatience with 
parliamentary opposition, was reflected in his linked statements: ‘Sometimes it 
is better to do the right thing and lose, than to win doing the wrong thing’; and 
‘[t]he country will think parliament will have behaved in a deeply irresponsible 
way. I have no doubt about that at all’ (quoted in The Guardian, 10 November 
2005). This response resonated with an executive mentality, to such a degree 
that Andrew Rawnsley observed that Mr Blair ‘spoke less like a prime minister 
in a parliamentary system of government and more as an American president 
might scorn an obstructive Congress’ (The Observer, 13 November 2005). 
In part Mr Blair’s sanguine reaction was also based on the partisan 
calculation that the Conservatives (and Labour rebels) might yet be haunted by 
their actions in the face of some future terrorist attack. Indeed, the partisan 
dimension of the development of anti-terrorist measures became more 
381 
pronounced after the two defeats suffered by the government in February 2006 
on the Racial and Religious Hatred Bill. The Home Secretary noted that: ‘I 
actually think that what happened was a purely political act by the 
Conservatives and Liberal Democrats and some of the people on the Labour 
side to try and deliver a defeat to the government rather than a genuine 
consideration of the issues’ (BBC News, 1 February 2006). The Home Office 
minister, Paul Goggins, echoed the earlier words of the Prime Minister: ‘We 
have some choices to take in the weeks and months ahead about whether the 
political objective of the House of Commons is to defeat the government at 
every possible opportunity or whether it is to get the right policies’ 
(news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/4668868.stm). 
 
Equally instructive was the response of sections of the media to the 
Commons defeat. Instead of commending MPs for restraining the wilder 
excesses of an omnipotent executive (in other words for doing what 
parliamentarians are routinely criticized for not doing) The Sun newspaper 
chose to argue that: ‘Treacherous MPs betrayed the British people last night by 
rejecting new laws to combat terror. They ignored the wishes of the vast 
majority of Britons and humiliated Tony Blair by inflicting his first Commons 
defeat’ (The Sun, 10 November 2005). The Star managed an even more succinct 
summary of events: ‘lame duck Blair was told to quack off last night following 
his most humiliating defeat’. 
 
Peripheral Vision: Democracy Below the UK Parliament 
 
While macular degeneration results in reduced central vision, good 
peripheral vision is generally retained. An analogy can thus be drawn with 
New Labour’s approach to government and democracy ‘beyond the centre’ 
in the case of devolution and decentralisation. In The Third Way Giddens 
argued the case for the ‘democratisation of democracy’ and that such 
democratization ‘first of all implies decentralisation’ (1998, 72). While the 
‘third way’ vision does not deny the need for ‘strong government’, a ‘key 
challenge of progressive politics’ is how to ‘use the state as an enabling 
force, protecting effective communities and voluntary organisations and 
encouraging their growth to tackle new needs, in partnership as appropriate’ 
(Blair, [1998] 2003). New Labour in ‘Third Way mode’ is thus ‘at ease with 
establishing a strong range of cross checking institutions at different levels of 
governance and ensuring that those institutions are open and accountable 
and capable of working alongside private, voluntary and community 
interests’ (Stoker, 2002, 431). There can be no doubt that New Labour in 
power has been pro-active, even hyper-active, in pursuing democratisation 




Devolved government was never likely to involve an institutional year zero, 
shaking off institutional continuities from the UK system of government, as 
some hoped (Mitchell, 2004, 35). 
 
Nonetheless, the hopes of ‘third way’ acolytes within New Labour were 
rooted in a conviction that: ‘The centralisation of decision making in Britain 
today [was] absurd’ (Mandelson and Liddle, 1996, 187). In this sense old 
continuities had to be fractured as the ‘closer politics — and power — is to 
people, the more chance there is of interaction between them. And that is what 
democracy is about’ (ibid., 197). Here, indeed, was a conception of democracy 
that was consciously counterposed to the established Westminster model and 
which was designed to generate, ultimately, an inclusionary and participatory 
‘new politics’. Yet, this was not a peculiarly New Labour vision as it was 
shared, especially in Scotland, by a range of other parties and civil society 
organisations. What was clear, however, was that there was to be an explicit 
attempt to move away from the adversarial politics of Westminster and to 
inculcate ‘grown-up, civilized’ behaviour in Edinburgh (Anne Begg, HC 
Debates, 13 January 1998, vol. 304, col. 177). 
 
The subsequent intent and achievements of the Labour government should 
not be underestimated: a Parliament in Scotland and Assemblies in Wales and 
Northern Ireland were rapidly established (even if the latter was in suspension 
after October 2002); and the cause of regional government was promoted in the 
institutional formof the Greater London Authority and the initiation (albeit 
stuttering and soon stalled) of a process of regional devolution in England. 
Indeed, within a very short period what was notable was the ‘normalisation of 
devolved governance in Scotland and Wales’ (Bradbury and Mitchell, 2005, 
301). If the term ‘normalization’ is accepted then overall assessments about 
‘success’ or ‘failure’ of devolution can be side-stepped here, and all that needs 
to be remembered in the following discussion is that any serious evaluation of 
devolution has to be ‘nuanced’ (Trench, 2004, 1). 
 
What is important to note, however, is that, in the exercise of ‘normal’ postdevolutionary 
politics, the symptoms of executive macular degeneration 
associated with the Westminster model came to be reproduced in mutated 
form in devolved institutions. The initial clear vision of the ‘new politics’ 
showed signs of progressive impairment as a result of the genetic institutional 
inheritances from the ‘old politics’. Clearly, the designers of the new 
representative institutions in Scotland and Wales consciously sought to 
inculcate novel values and norms, and to work from an institutional blueprint, 
that explicitly did not replicate the Westminster model. Yet, in trying to import 
the values of participation, inclusion, openness and cooperation into the new 
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representative institutions in Scotland and Wales, the designers both misread 
the Westminster model and underestimated the inherent tension between 
popular inclusion and exclusion in the very nature of representative democracy 
(see Judge, 2005). 
 
One consequence of this misreading was that the inclusionary vision of 
democratised Scottish governance became blurred.6 Assessments of the extent 
to which a new politics based upon a ‘participatory ideal’ have intruded into 
Scottish governance have concluded that when ‘measured in terms of political 
power’ participatory initiatives associated with the Scottish parliament ‘appear 
more symbolic than effective’ (Mitchell, 2004, 39; see also Bonney, 2003). More 
strikingly, there was a dawning realisation among the more naïve proponents 
of the ‘new politics’ that ‘in the end, the decisions of the Parliament have to be 
made by elected representatives’ (Bonney, 2003, 467). If notions of 
representative democracy were once more to be privileged in this manner, 
the genetic constitutional ‘stemcell ’ from which such notions derived in the 
first instance — the Westminster model — held the potential to be reproduced 
in modified form in the devolved institutions. 
 
Indeed, the symptoms of adversarial politics have been apparent in 
Scotland. Arter (2003, 18), for example, concluded that the relationship 
between the majority Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition that formed the 
Executive and the leading opposition party, the Scottish National Party, had 
been ‘quintessentially adversarial’. He proceeded to note that this relationship 
had been sustained by the ‘ground rules of the Westminster game’. Hence, the 
parties in the executive coalition have expected the loyalty of their respective 
MSPs and have sought to enhance discipline in parliament through intra-party 
rule changes (see The Sunday Herald, 23 October 2005). Recognition that 
‘power lies in the coalition at least so long as the coalition acts cohesively’ has 
contributed to a ‘remarkable’ rarity of Executive defeats by Parliament 
(Mitchell, 2005, 37); and, overall, the ‘tight grip of parties’ has been adjudged 
to have ‘reduced the liberating potential of devolution’ (Keating, 2005, 218). 
When transposed into the legislative process, there is evidence that the 
‘ground rules’ are contributing to ‘classic Executive dominance in Scotland 
that could be used to support the arguments of the ‘old politics’ camp’ 
(Shephard and Cairney, 2004, 854).7 In November 2005 the Scottish political 
editor of The Herald observed that ‘quietly in the background something is 
going badly wrong with parliament legislation’ (The Herald, 15 November 
2005). What was happening was that the rights of ordinary MSPs to introduce 
‘non-executive bills’ were being curtailed. Similarly, the over-optimistic predevolution 
consensus, which envisaged a ‘more active legislature which 
directed the budget as part of a ‘new politics’’ (Midwinter, 2005, 28), was 
inhibited by the inheritance of ‘a classic incremental budgetary system from 
Westminster in which parliamentary scrutiny was minimal’ (ibid., 13). 
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One further inheritance of ‘old politics’ was reflected in the press coverage 
afforded to the new parliament. A persistent theme of press reporting has been 
the uncovering of ‘scandals’ in parliament and the executive — most of which 
were trivial in their own right but generated significant coverage. As Keating 
(2005, 93) observes, there has also been an ‘almost universal tendency to 
describe devolution as a disappointment and a failure’. From the outset the 
issue of the new parliament building contributed to this sense of failure and 
plagued the new parliament throughout its first four-year term, as the costs 
spiralled from an initial estimate of d40 million to over d430 million by the time 
the building was officially opened in October 2004. For many in the Scottish 
media the intricacies of the architectural design and subsequent problems with 
construction on the Holyrood site served as a metaphor of the inherent 
deficiencies of the devolution project itself. The political inhabitants of the 
building were also subject to withering scrutiny, with MSPs widely dismissed as 
political pygmies or second-rate politicians. This concern with individuals 
rather than issues and with scandals rather than serious debate was epitomised 
in the circumstances leading to the resignation of the Conservative party leader 
David McLetchie in November 2005. Academics and journalists alike voiced 
concern that the use of FOI requests for taxi receipts had ‘trivialized Holyrood 
and demonized MSPs’ (Sunday Herald, 6 November 2005; also see Ruaridh 
Nicoll, The Guardian, Media, 6 November 2005). 
 
If one of the objectives of devolution was to reverse an apparent decline in 
both popular trust and confidence in the political process in Scotland and to 
increase electoral participation then ‘devolution has not helped to reconnect 
the public with the way they are governedy it simply has not made much 
difference one way or the other’ (Curtice, 2004, 233). Moreover, focus group 
research conducted for the Arbuthnott Commission (2006, 69) found that, even 
after the introduction of the Scottish parliament, there remained ‘a deep 
distrust amongst many citizens, particularly younger ones, of established 
politics and the relevance of voting’. Generally, the Commission found high 
levels of political disengagement and cynicism. Indeed, there was the irony that 
research, undertaken on behalf of the Commission, found: ‘there was a 
widespread assumption amongst those interviewed that the MP [rather than 
the MSP] is the most important representative for their area’ (George Street 




If the ‘third way’ vision is clear — that there should be ‘experiments with 
democracy’ (Giddens, 1998, 775) to re-establish contacts between citizens and 
government — then, given that local government accounts for approximately 
80 per cent of state-citizen contacts annually (Stoker, 2002, 422), localities 
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would appear to be the obvious place to focus these experiments. 
Unquestionably, New Labour in power has actively pursued a ‘radical 
programme of democratic renewal’ (Wilson and Game, 2002, 354).8 This 
‘modernisation’ programme has included: new modes of citizen consultation 
and engagement (through citizens’ juries; focus groups, citizens’ panels, 
deliberative opinion polls, and local referendums); modernisation of electoral 
arrangements (through the adoption of PR in Scottish local authorities; all 
postal vote ballots, electronic voting and counting, and e-democracy 
initiatives); and modernisation of council organisational structures (through 
elected mayors, cabinet models, and local strategic partnerships). The actual 
impact of these initiatives, however, is open to dispute; as what is far from clear 
is the extent to which any of these initiatives ‘offer participants a meaningful 
route to making a difference to the ultimate outcome’ (Sullivan, 2004, 195). 
Leaving aside an evaluation of the actual enhancement of local democracy 
since 1997 (for sceptical reviews see for example Lownes and Wilson, 2003; 
Sullivan et al., 2004; Dinham, 2005), the true significance of the ‘local 
experiments’ with democracy is that they were conducted at all by a 
New Labour government accused of ‘control freakery gone mad’ (Stoker, 
2002, 430). 
 
One explanation is that the discourse of local modernisation simply 
‘provided a convenient smokescreen for Labour’s centralising and hence 
authoritarian tendencies: it gave the excuse to tell local authorities what to do’ 
(Coulson, 2004, 472). But this overstates the case, as New Labour had a clear 
vision of the value of democratisation that was not to be obscured by any such 
‘smokescreen’. A more considered analysis would direct attention to the 
possibility that democratic renewal was about restoring trust and confidence in 
local democracy and especially local representative institutions. In this sense 
‘local democracy referred to the quality of the relationship between local 
authorities and their communities and service users — and not the degree of 
autonomy or level of capacity enjoyed by elected councils’ (Lowndes and 
Wilson, 2003, 290). This point is neatly captured in Wilson and Game’s (2002, 
353) observation that: 
 
Led by Deputy Prime Minister and Environment Secretary John Prescott, 
ministers were keen from the outset to emphasise their genuine belief in and 
commitment to a strong, democratically elected local government. Things 
would be very different under Labour but they, as ministers in a popularly 
elected national government, would be the ones deciding just how different 
things would be. 
 
Conforming to a power dependency model of central-local relations, New 
Labour in government did not seek to reduce its capacity to formulate and 
drive through its local initiatives. In this regard it retained a ‘top down, rule 
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bound, control orientation’ (Stoker, 2002, 430). Yet, from this centralist 
orientation or perspective, where its own scope for policy discretion was secure, 
New Labour displayed a clear ‘peripheral vision’ of the need for bottom-up 
processes of democratisation at the local level. 
 
This bottom-up perspective has also been apparent in a range of 
decentralized, participatory initiatives in the provision of other public services. 
One of the most visible was the Department of Health’s Your Health, Your 
Care, Your Say consultative process which preceded the drafting of the 2006 
White Paper Our Health, Our Care, Our Say (Cm6737). In the autumn of 
2005, four regional deliberative forums were convened — billed as ‘listening 
events’ — to enable local people to discuss the future of the health and social 
care services. The consultation process culminated in a ‘Citizen’s Summit’ in 
Birmingham on 29 October 2005. At this ‘summit’ 998 people, drawn from 
across England, met to discuss and vote on a range of options about the 
priorities, choices and type of health and care provision in the early 21st 
century. As such it was the ‘biggest public consultation of its kind ever held in 
Britain’. While participants were selected to reflect a cross section of the 
population, special effort was made to ‘make sure that the views of people who 
don’t always get involved in this kind of consultation were heard’ (see 
www.dh.gov.uk/assetRoot/04/12/27/68/04122768.pdf). 
 
Ultimately, however, the real test of such processes remains that: 
‘participation and inclusion are only meaningful if people’s views can be seen 
to make a difference and to influence the development of policy’ (HcHugh and 
Parvin, 2005, 15). In an effort to ‘pass’ this test, Health ministers met in March 
2006 with 100 participants who had attended the original deliberative events in 
order to explain the policies outlined in the White Paper. This follow-up event 
was entitled ‘Holding the Government to Account’. Ministers took this 
opportunity to ‘present how the Government had included many of the 
suggestions made by the public during the 2005 listening events’ (www.dh. 
gov.uk/NewsHome/YourHealthYourCareYourSay/YourSayArticle/fs/en? 
CONTENT_ID=4131703&chk=tDPIyT). Equally, in the White Paper itself, 
ministers also took the opportunity to explain why the views of participants 
had not been accepted on some important issues (see Cm 6737, 2006, 
paras 2.28, 8.13). 
 
Connected Blind Spot and Peripheral Vision: Electoral Reform 
 
Nowhere is the connection between New Labour’s central democratic blind 
spot and its clear participatory peripheral vision better illustrated than in the 
view of electoral reform adopted by governments since 1997. 
In November 2005 an Electoral Choice Bill was introduced, as a 10minute 
Rule Bill in the House of Commons, by Labour MPs John Denham and David 
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Chaytor and by the Liberal Democrat MP Nick Harvey. With no hope of 
translation into legislation, the Bill was designed to publicise the failure of New 
Labour to reform the system for Westminster elections and to suggest 
mechanisms whereby a referendum on electoral reform could be prompted 
without having to wait for the government to call such a referendum. Despite 
manifesto pledges in 1997 and 2001 to hold a referendum and to revisit this 
issue after a review of the operation of non-Westminster electoral systems, New 
Labour in power had managed to obscure electoral reform from its central 
vision. Indeed, as Kavanagh et al. note (2006, 399–400): ‘As of 2006, PR is 
effectively off the agenda and there is little prospect of a referendum in the near 
future. [Many New Labour ministers still calculate that the established 
electoral arrangements, a key part of the traditional Westminster system and its 
underpinning elitism, still operates in their interests’. 
 
In essence, however, this ‘calculation’ was restricted to the centre; for, in its 
peripheral vision, New Labour was more than willing to identify the 
democratic case for electoral reform and to experiment with a variety of 
different systems (even if implementation of such reform reflected more 
expedient partisan concerns). Elections to the European Parliament are based 
upon a regional list system with counting by the d’Hondt method. The Scottish 
Parliament, the Welsh National Assembly, and the Greater London Authority 
are elected under the Additional Member System (with different proportions of 
list members in each institution); the single transferable vote (STV) is used in 
all elections in Northern Ireland except those for Westminster; from 2007 local 
authority elections in Scotland will be conducted by STV; and Mayoral 
elections in England use the Supplementary Vote system. Far from being 
‘blind’ to the virtues of electoral reform, therefore, New Labour has possessed 
an extensive vision, some would argue too wide-ranging a vision, in its 
implementation of a raft of diverse electoral systems. 
 
The fact that Scotland alone had four different systems in operation in 2006 
not only revealed the reality of ‘multi-level governance’ but also reflected the 
complexities attendant upon the asymmetric and piecemeal implementation of 
voting reforms. Indeed, concern over these complexities and asymmetries led to 
the appointment of the Arbuthnott Commission in May 2004 to consider the 
impact of the multiplicity of voting systems and differences in constituency 
boundaries upon voter participation. While the Commission’s final report 
found no evidence that multiple voting systems or different boundaries 
confused voters to the extent of deterring electoral involvement (Arbuthnott 
Commission, 2006, para 2.18), it did find considerable ignorance of all voting 
systems apart from first-past-the-post. Yet the Commission concluded that the 
‘case for introducing a more proportional system fory[Westminster] elections 
is now very strong, since after 2007 they will be the only ones held in Scotland 
which do not involve a significant degree of proportionality’ (ibid., para 2.17). 
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Yet, if there is no direct correlation between voting system and turnout — 
given that voters tend to be equally ignorant of the mechanics of all systems 
apart from the first-past-the-post — then New Labour might feel justified in 
arguing that the focus of attention for Westminster elections should be upon 
encouraging electors to cast their vote in the first place rather than upon the 
technical processes by which votes were counted. Certainly New Labour had 
no doubts that ‘it is the role of Government to be concerned about the 
condition of our democracy’ (Harman, 2006). Indeed, given the historically low 
turnouts at the 2001 and 2005 general elections in the UK, the government 
could hardly be anything other than ‘concerned’ about democracy in the UK. 
The view of New Labour in government as to ‘what democracy should look 
like’ was that democratic legitimacy was based upon three electoral 
propositions: ‘everyone who is eligible to vote having the right to vote; people 
who are entitled to vote actually wanting to vote; and no one fiddling the vote’ 
(ibid.). These principles found legislative form in the Representation of the 
People Act 2000, which allowed voters to request a postal vote in any statutory 
election in Britain and enabled local authorities to pilot schemes for electoral 
arrangements, most importantly for all postal ballots. The European 
Parliamentary and Local Elections (Pilots) Act 2004 sanctioned further pilots 
in four regions in the combined European and local government elections on 10 
June 2004. More broadly, the Electoral Administration Act 2006 sought, 
amongst other things, to improve the electoral registration process, enhance 
information and publicity about the elections, ease access to voting stations, 
provide stronger deterrents for electoral fraud, improve the effectiveness of the 
administration of elections, enhance participation through reducing the age of 
candidacy from21 to 18, and simplify the rules for candidates and political 
parties. 
 
New Labour’s concern with electoral processes also found institutional form 
in the creation of the Electoral Commission in November 2000. Under the 
Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 the Commission was 
charged with keeping electoral law and practice under review, as well as 
monitoring and evaluating local election pilot schemes, and increasing 
understanding of, and participation in, the democratic process. The Commission 
was also required to report on the administration of all major elections. As 
part of this reporting exercise, the Commission has paid particular attention to 
the issue of turnout and the specific theme of the electoral disengagement of 
young people (see Electoral Commission, 2002, 2005, 2006). 
 
Alongside this institutional commitment to the enhancement of electoral 
democracy New Labour has also been keenly aware of the fact that: ‘Our 
democracy lacks legitimacy if, whatever the formal rules about universal 
suffrage and the right to vote, people don’t make it a reality by turning out to 
vote’ (Harman, 2006). What was of particular concern was the development of 
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‘democracy deserts’ in certain areas of the UK; where the problems of social 
exclusion were compounded by low levels of democratic engagement as 
manifested in low levels of registration and low levels of turnout. The dilemma 
highlighted in these areas was that the citizens who were most dependent on the 
state, and were most directly affected by redistributive policies, were precisely 





The purpose of this article has been to review the democratic vision of New 
Labour in government since 1997. Many critics would argue that this is a futile 
task as the projection of such a vision has not been part of the New Labour 
project and, in fact, successive Blair governments have served to undermine the 
historic image of representative democracy in the UK (see Norton, 2004, 544). 
But this is not the conclusion reached here. Indeed, if New Labour warrants 
criticismit is not for failing to have a vision of where it is going but rather of 
having two distinct visions of democracy that coexist in an uneasy, and often 
paradoxical, relationship. The contention of this article has been that New 
Labour in government has displayed, on the one side, an orthodox, centralized 
vision encapsulated in the ‘Westminster model’; yet, on the other, has 
simultaneously projected a ‘third way’ image based on a ‘deepening and 
widening of democracy’; of ‘enabling government’; and of ‘double devolution’ 
(Giddens, 1998; Miliband, 2006). In the eyes of many of New Labour’s critics 
this is a ‘rose-tinted’ peripheral vision, one that fails to compensate for the 
central blindspot of the Westminster vision (see Morrison, 2001, 501), and one 
that raises questions about the compatibility of indirect/representative and 
direct/participatory democratic principles and practice. As a result, governments 
since 1997 have displayed the classic symptoms of institutional macular 
degeneration: with a blind spot at the centre (Westminster) yet with clear 
peripheral vision (both in terms of decentralisation and participation beyond 
Westminster). 
 
What is striking is that, after almost a decade in power, the Westminster 
model is still at the centre of the government’s democratic vision. Despite a 
period of perpetual constitutional reform, and persistent challenges to the 
practice of Westminster-based politics, the verdict remains that: ‘New Labour’s 
constitutional project cannot be interpreted as a fundamental paradigm shift’ 
(Flinders, 2005, 87). The failure to make this ‘shift’ has variously been ascribed 
to a paucity of intellect, an absence of joined-up thinking, and an unwillingness 
to conceive of an ‘alternative constitution’ (see Smith, 2003, 591–593; Flinders, 
2004, 143; Johnson, 2004, 308–309). Yet such criticisms do raise a fundamental 
question about what can realistically be expected of New Labour, or any party 
390 
in government, to fashion an ‘alternative’ democratic vision. For, as argued 
elsewhere (Judge, 2005, 277–279), the Westminster model still symbolises the 
elemental values of representation and accountability that serve as the 
prescriptions of legitimate government in the UK. The Westminster model 
retains its significance as an organising perspective in the sense of identifying a 
set of norms, values and meanings that legitimate the actions and interactions 
of state institutions. These might very well be idealised — in their specification 
of a serial flow of legitimacy from the people through their elected 
representatives to an accountable and responsive executive. Nonetheless, these 
values and their institutional embodiment remain the ‘stem cell’ of modern UK 
government. 
 
More particularly this model ‘clearly distinguishes between participation 
and decision-making, and applies different rules to each it does [not] confuse 
the notion of fair consultation and participation with fair decision-making 
procedures’ (McHugh and Parvin, 2005, 17). In fact, the distinctiveness of 
parliamentary representation is hermetically sealed in the Westminster model 
in the notion of parliamentary sovereignty — which privileges representation 
based upon UK parliamentary elections above all other forms of representation 
and popular participation. This has been the central vision of all 
governments in the era of the mass franchise. This has also been the vision that 
has been obscured in the practice of ‘executive sovereignty’ and which has 
displayed the symptoms of ‘macular degeneration’. 
 
What critics of the Westminster model tend to focus upon, therefore, is not 
the model itself but the challenges posed by ‘governance’ to the model, or the 
political practices that have been associated with the model: the accretion of 
power to the executive, the closed and exclusionary processes of decision 
making in the core executive, and the inversion of accountability. What New 
Labour has been reluctant to contemplate is the restitution of the democratic 
principles of the model, not least because the model has always been an 
idealised representation of parliamentary government (see Birch, 1964, 65, 74). 
As a result, redress of the democratic imbalances and inversions of 
accountability between parliament and the executive have largely been blanked 
from the reformist vision of New Labour in government. The mutually 
reinforcing norms—of party cohesion, party discipline, partisan risk-aversion, 
pathological antipathy to media criticism, collective notions of executive 
responsibility, closed and restricted modes of decision making — provide for 
the incubation of macular degeneration. 
 
The historic problem in the UK has been how to envisage such a rebalancing 
between legislature and executive given the blind spot at the centre of 
successive governments’ institutional vision. The fundamental challenge has 
been, and remains, how to overcome the conundrum that the ‘dominant value 
system’ — executive hegemony — at the heart of the practice of the 
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Westminster model needs to be redressed by executive action itself. New 
Labour, to date, in common with all of its post-war predecessors in 
government, has failed to address this conundrum. Yet, for those readers in 
need of a ‘happy ending’, the period since 1997 has also witnessed the 
strengthening of potential ‘normative subsystems’ — of ‘deviant subcultures’ 
— which have challenged leadership policies and been prepared to infringe the 
norms of party discipline and voting cohesion in Westminster. In essence, these 
subcultures have emphasised collective (parliamentary) processes rather than 
majoritarian (executive) processes of decision-making. At their root these 
subcultures have a vision of representative processes focused beyond the 
executive, and provide, in essence, an ‘oppositional’ vision (whether of the 
formal opposition parties in Westminster, or of the ‘informal opposition’ 
provided by ‘rebels’ within the Labour party itself, or of campaigning 
organisations beyond Westminster). These subcultures value effective representation, 
seek a rebalancing of executive and legislative power, and recognize 
that the stranglehold of conjoined party and executive leadership positions 
needs to be broken — either through a concordat between the legislature and 
the executive (see Power Inquiry, 2006, 135–138); or more radically by electoral 
reformat Westminster (see Wright, 2004, 875; Labour Campaign for Electoral 
Reform, 2005); or more radically still through a formal separation of powers in 
a written constitution (see Allen, 2003, 70; Wright, 2004, 875). The challenge is 
how to enable such a rebalancing between legislature and executive before the 
symptoms of macular degeneration afflict future majority party leaders on 
entering government in Westminster.9 
 
Notes 
1 The macular is the central part of the retina that is responsible for central vision and the ability to 
see in detail. Macular degeneration affects this central part of the retina and results in localised 
vision loss — so generating a blind spot at the centre of vision, but without affecting peripheral 
vision. 
2 In the draft new Civil Service Code this instruction was pared down to: ‘You must not: disclose 
official information without authority’ (Cabinet Office, 2006, para 5). 
3 Lord Birt did eventually appear before the Public Administration Committee in April 2006, after 
he had left his position as the PM’s Strategy Adviser. As Tony Wright, Chairman of the 
Committee observed, ‘It has been lovely to see you. The sky would not have fallen in had you 
come to us when you were still in office. The sky will not fall in because you have come to us now’ 
(HC 756-iii, 2006, Q356). In his evidence Lord Birt stuck rigidly to the Cabinet Office rules: ‘I am 
very happy to talk to the Committee about the sorts of issues that have been raised so far, namely 
the way in which government structures itself to address strategic questions, but I am afraid I do 
not want to go into any of the detail of my advice to the Prime Minister or the response to that 
advice’ (HC 756-iii, 2006, Q259). 
4 Notably the types of information requested by sections of the tabloid press included the number 
of windows at the Department of Education and Skills, the amount of money spent by 
departments on toilet paper, the cost of the PM’s make-up since 1999, and the PM’s guest list at 
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Chequers. In response, Lord Falconer pledged to review the operation of the Act to curb ‘the 
wilder fevers of journalist wish-lists’ (The Guardian, 31 December 2005). 
5 In rapid succession New Labour introduced the Terrorism Act 2000, the Anti-Terrorism, 
Crime and Security Act 2001, the Prevention of TerrorismAct 2005, and the Terrorism Act 
2006. Each legislative measure contained, in Amnesty International’s opinion, ‘provisions 
which are clearly incompatible with human rights law and standards and have given rise to 
serious human rights violations’ (HL75-ii/HC 561-ii, 2005, Ev 70). In addition, the 
Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 and the Identity Cards Act 2006, both of 
which formed part of the government’s counter-terrorism strategy, attracted wide-ranging 
criticism from human rights groups. 
6 The focus here is upon Scottish governance. On Wales and Northern Ireland see Judge 
2005. 
7 Shephard and Cairney’s findings reveal the complexity and contingency of relationships 
between the legislature and the executive in Scotland. They also present evidence of ‘power-
sharing’ and support for the ‘new politics camp’. 
8 The focus of the following discussion is upon English local government. On local 
government and devolution see McConnell, 2004; Judge, 2005; Jeffery, 2006. 
9 The last sentence of an article is perhaps an inappropriate place for speculation. If, 
however, macular degeneration is associated with ‘insider’ status and holding conjoined 
party, legislative and executive leadership positions, the conundrumis how to inoculate 
‘outsiders’, in the transition into executive office, fromthe pathologies of executivementality. 
In other words, how is an ‘outsider’, oppositional perspective on the relationship between 
legislature and executive to be retained? In this sense, the fate of electoral reformfor 
Westminster elections is one critical test for macular degeneration; and it is a test that has 
produced negative results from successive governments. Yet, Gordon Brown — after the 
2005 election, in his position as heir-apparent to Tony Blair and PM-in-waiting (and also 
‘outsider’ to the Blair cabal) — expressed his desire to shape a future constitutional 
settlement around a ‘compact between the local and the national, and between the executive 
and the legislature’ (The Guardian, 27 February 2006). In preparation for this settlement Mr 
Brown countenanced a ‘renewed debate on issues from the role of parties and electoral 
reform’. Brown’s positioning as an ‘outsider’ within the executive may prove decisive in 
reducing the size of the institutional blind spot should he become PM. Alternatively, 
in the event of David Cameron becoming prime minister, there is some indication that the 
dominance of the executive and the adversarial nature of party competition would at least be 
recognised as inhibitions on democratic advance. In December 2005, Mr Cameron created a 
‘Democracy Task Force’ (www.conservatives.com/tile.do?def1/4democracy.taskforce.page). 
In June 2006, in a speech to the Power Inquiry Conference, he acknowledged that: 
‘Consensus can be a good thing’. He went on to state: ‘I want to put Parliament at the centre 
of national life. I want to address the shift away from the legislature to the executive. We 
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